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I argue that the ability to compute phrase structure grammars is indicative of a particular
kind of thought. This type of thought that is only available to cognitive systems that have
access to the computations that allow the generation and interpretation of the structural
descriptions of phrase structure grammars. The study of phrase structure grammars, and
formal language theory in general, is thus indispensable to studies of human cognition, for
it makes explicit both the unique type of human thought and the underlying mechanisms
in virtue of which this thought is made possible.
 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A revealing way in which to conceptualise the kind of thought that appears to be uniquely human is by considering the
generative capacity of rule systems such as grammars and the way in which such systems can be arranged in a mathematical
hierarchy of increasing generative power. Oneway inwhich to do so is the so-called Chomsky hierarchy, which was originally
cast as part of the explanation of the formal properties of natural languages, but it turns out that it is also useful for
understanding the formal properties of types of mental computations and hence of particular thought processes. I argue that
the subset of human thought that is not shared with animals can be accounted for by the underlying computational
mechanisms of language that structure this subset of human thought in a particular way. This subset of thought is unavailable
to cognitive systems that do not have access to the computations underlying natural language.
Fitch and Hauser (2004) argue in regard to tamarins that they “suffer from a speciﬁc and fundamental computational
limitation on their ability to spontaneously recognize or remember hierarchically organized acoustic structures” based on
phrase structure grammars (Fitch and Hauser, 2004: 380). Their research suggests that nonhumans are in a sense stuck in
their attempt to interpret patterns based on phrase structure grammars, for they attempt to interpret such patterns on the
basis of ﬁnite state grammars, which is not possible. Thismakes phrase structure grammar “stimuli seemmuchmore complex
to them [nonhumans] and perhaps even unlearnable in ﬁnite time” (Fitch and Hauser, 2004: 380). Humans, on the other
hand, easily learn phrase structure grammars and appear to favour input that can be interpreted as such. Phrase structure
grammars form a crucial component of all human languages (allowing for recursively-embedded, hierarchically-structured
strings), and the computations that allow their generation and interpretation underlie a uniquely human type of thought.
What I would like to explore in this article is the inference from the ability to recognise phrase structure grammars to the
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structure grammars to a particular computational limitation, but I think that we can conclude more than that. If animals have
a fundamental computational limitation because they cannot recognise phrase structure grammars, then it follows that
cognitive systems that can recognise phrase structure grammars do not have this computational limitation. Now, if (as I argue
below) the underlying computations necessary to generate and recognise phrase structure grammars are the same
computations necessary to generate and recognise human-type thought, then it follows that any system that cannot
recognise phrase structure grammars also cannot think those particular thoughts (though it can of course think other kinds of
thoughts not dependent on such computations).
I should note that there is a tradition in philosophy that argues that all thought requires language (Malcolm, 1972;
Davidson, 1975, 1982; Dummett, 1989; McDowell, 1994), whereas others have agreed with Fodor (1975: 56) that the
“obvious (and, I should have thought, sufﬁcient) refutation of the claim that natural languages are the medium of thought is
that there are nonverbal organisms that think” (see Ryle, 1968; Slezak, 2002; de Waal, 2016). I do not want to weigh in on the
debate of whether cognitive processes as understood by cognitive scientists are the same as what philosophers such as
Malcolm and Davidson understand to be thought processes. Nothing thus follows frommy use of thought or thought process in
contrast to cognition or cognitive process. Whether we should conceive of the cognitive processes that humans share with
animals as thoughts or not is orthogonal to my concerns here.
This article is structured as follows: I ﬁrst discuss the details of the Chomsky hierarchy, focussing on phrase structure
grammars and the structural descriptions necessary for natural language sentence generation and interpretation. I then
discuss the inference from the inability to interpret certain grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy to the existence of a
fundamental computational limitation. I then argue that the underlying computations necessary for phrase structure
grammars are the same as those necessary for human thought (though not for the kinds of thoughts we sharewith animals). I
argue in the ﬁnal section that if this is the case, then we can make the inference from the ability to interpret phrase structure
grammars to the ability to think certain types of thoughts.
The discussion of the Chomsky hierarchy in what follows is not a rehearsal or a rehashing of the debates in formal
linguistics in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, what we have here is a well understood mathematical hierarchy that has in recent
research been applied in a newway to a new domain. Rogers and Hauser (2010), for example, propose a range of patterns that
are based on grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy and which can be used in current and future research. They argue that
experiments testing whether particular animals can interpret patterns based on particular grammars on the hierarchy offer a
window into the underlying psychological mechanisms of these animals. I think that such experiments also offer a window
into the underlying psychological mechanisms (hence thoughts) of humans, and help clarify the nature of human thought and
the underlying mechanisms that make such thought possible.2. The hierarchy of grammars
The generative capacity of rule systems such as grammars can be arranged in a mathematical hierarchy of increasing
generative power. One way to do this was ﬁrst formulated by Chomsky (1956, 1959; see also Chomsky & Schützenberger
1963).1 Though originally cast as part of the explanation of the formal properties of natural languages, it turns out that
this hierarchy is also useful for understanding the formal properties of types of mental computations and hence of particular
kinds of thoughts. A grammar here is understood as a computational device that enumerates the sentences of a language: it is
a set of rules that gives a recursive enumeration of the sentences belonging to the language. One requirement that a grammar
must meet is that it be ﬁnite: the grammar cannot be, for example, a list of word sequences because there are potentially
inﬁnitely many of these. Hence, we investigate the structure of language by studying the ﬁnite devices (i.e., the grammars)
that are capable of generating and enumerating an inﬁnite number of sentences. It is not enough, though, to have a device that
canmerely generate the sentences of a language, for there is more than oneway inwhich to generate each sentence. Knowing
the way in which a sentence was generated is crucial for natural language, for each way corresponds to a different structural
description and thus to a different meaning. In other words, the history of the way in which a sentence was generated is
crucial for its interpretation. These two ways of understanding the generative capacity of grammars are referred to,
respectively, as the grammar’s weak generative capacity and strong generative capacity. A grammar is said to weakly generate
a set of sentences but to strongly generate a set of structural descriptions (Chomsky,1965). Each structural description uniquely
determines a sentence, but the reverse is not the case: so one weakly generated sentence can have several strongly generated
structural descriptions, each corresponding to one of the sentence’s meanings.
Take the sentence The agent saw the manwith the binoculars: there are at least two different ways inwhich to generate this
sentence ((1) and (2) below), each of which corresponds to a different interpretation of the sentence.
(1) [S [NP The agent] [VP [VP [V saw] [NP the man] [PP with the binoculars]]].
(2) [S [NP The agent] [VP [VP [V saw] [NP the man [PP with the binoculars]]]].1 The hierarchy was a systematisation and expansion of the earlier work of, amongst others, Post (1947), Rosenbloom (1950), Bar-Hillel (1953). See Lasnik
and Uriagereka (2012) for discussion.
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seeing referred to by the verbal expression. The interpretation of (1) is thus that the agent saw the man by making use of a
pair of binoculars. In (2), the same PP is now attached to the direct object noun phrase (NP), thus modifying the man
referred to by that nominal expression. The interpretation of (2) is thus that the agent saw a man who was holding a pair
of binoculars.
It is clear in this simple example how the way in which each sentence was generated is crucial for obtaining the correct
interpretation.We need to know the derivational history of the sentence duringwhich, say, the PPwas attached to the VP thus
obtaining the interpretation of (1). In other words, if we don’t know the way in which the sentence was generated we cannot
interpret it. Hence, a theory of language must be able to produce not only the observable corpus of sentences but “must also
indicate how, in general, relevant structural information can be obtained for a particular sentence generated by a particular
grammar” (Chomsky, 1959: 138). That is, the theory must specify a class of structural descriptions that provide “certain in-
formationwhich will facilitate and serve as the basis for an account of how x [a sentence] is used and understood by speakers
of the language whose grammar is f” (Chomsky, 1959: 138). It thus follows that if a cognitive system cannot generate the
required structural descriptions then it cannot access the interpretations inherent in those particular structural descriptions.
A grammar that is able to generate the recursively enumerable set of all the sentences of a language is of very limited value
and interest unless the underlying principles of the construction and generation of each sentence are also provided, thus
shedding light on the structural information of each sentence that is used in language production and comprehension.
The different properties of different types of grammars, however, mean that not all types of grammars are able to generate the
required underlying structures for natural language, and thus are unable to provide the structural information that forms the
basis for the comprehension and production of sentences. The hierarchy of such grammars was originally described by
Chomsky as follows:
Type 0: recursively enumerable grammars
Type 1: context-sensitive grammars
Type 2: context-free grammars
Type 3: ﬁnite state grammars
Each type of grammar forms a subset of the (more complex) grammar above it, so that the set of recursively enumerable
grammars includes context-sensitive grammars, and the set of context-sensitive grammars includes context-free grammars,
and all of the sets in the hierarchy include ﬁnite state grammars. This relation of inclusiveness is unidirectional, so that even
though the set of recursively enumerable grammars includes context-sensitive grammars, the reverse is not the case; the
same is true for the other sets of grammars. It should be stressed that the Chomsky hierarchy is concerned with general-
isations about strong generative capacity, with the structures underlying observable natural language sentences (see Lasnik
and Uriagereka, 2012 for an excellent overview of structure in natural language).
Let us brieﬂy see what the details of the grammars of the Chomsky hierarchy consist in. I will then argue that there are
certain types of cognitive processes that are only available to cognitive systems that can compute grammars higher than type
3 (ﬁnite state grammars). That is, grammars higher up on the hierarchy, which are known collectively as phrase structure
grammars, are indicative of uniquely human thoughts.2.1. Finite state grammars and phrase structure grammars
A ﬁnite state grammar is the simplest possible grammar that can generate an inﬁnite number of strings. It is usually
conceived of as a machine that switches from one state to another by producing a certain symbol (say, an English word). This
machine can run through a sequence of such states and produce consecutive symbols that together produce a string. A simple
example of a ﬁnite state grammar can be represented by the following state diagrams reproduced from Chomsky (1957: 19).
(3a) The man comes
(3b) The men come(4)(5a) The old old man comes
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number of strings by adding a closed loop as in (6); it is possible to add any number of closed loops. A string is produced by
following a particular path of the arrows from the left to the ﬁnal point on the right, and the further along the arrow path we
go the more restrictions are placed that limit the possible words that can be added to the sequence.
The grammars that produce sentences and thus languages in this manner, known mathematically as ﬁnite state
Markov processes, form the lowest level of the Chomsky hierarchy and they are contrasted with phrase structure
grammars, which form the top three levels of the hierarchy. If the aim is the construction of a grammar of a natural
language, then it can be mathematically shown that it is impossible, not just difﬁcult, to construct a ﬁnite state grammar
that will produce all and only the grammatical sentences of English (Chomsky, 1957). This applies to all natural languages,
not just English. That is, due to the computational limitations inherent in ﬁnite state grammars, they cannot generate the
required structures of what may at ﬁrst seem like relatively simple languages. For example, a language that includes all
and only sentences of n occurrences of a followed by n occurrences of b (i.e., anbn, which generates ab, aabb, aaabbb etc.)
cannot be generated by ﬁnite state grammars because the a’s and b’s in question are not consecutive but rather are
embedded in other strings. In other words, a ﬁnite state grammar has no way of keeping track of the structural de-
pendency between the a’s and b’s, it cannot keep track of how many a’s have been generated so that it can then go on and
generate that exact same number of b’s. These sorts of dependencies are essential for natural language sentence pro-
duction and comprehension. The language described by anbn is a simple phrase structure grammar: speciﬁcally, it is a
context-free grammar that is one up on the Chomsky hierarchy from ﬁnite state grammars. The difference in generative
capacity between ﬁnite state grammars and phrase structure grammars in general is that the latter allow for self-
embedding. That is, all phrase structure grammars have the ability to generate recursively embedded and hierarchical-
ly structured strings.
Sentences of natural language are objects structured in a speciﬁc way, but the strings that ﬁnite state grammars generate
have the wrong sort of structure in regard to natural language. In other words, the structures generated by phrase structure
grammars are essential for natural language but cannot be generated by ﬁnite state grammars. This is not a mere working
assumption but rather a result of formal linguists and logicians who have shown that the mathematical properties of ﬁnite
state grammars are not adequate for natural language (Chomsky and Miller, 1958). Another way to put the matter is as
follows. Suppose that a ﬁnite state grammar could produce, say, the extensional set of all English sentences (supposewe could
draw the state diagrams of all English sentences). That would not be sufﬁcient because what matters for natural language
interpretation are the structural descriptions in virtue of which meaning is made possible. If a cognitive system cannot
generate the underlying dependencies between elements of sentences then the interpretations that such dependencies
specify are unavailable to it.
Before continuing, a number of clariﬁcatory notes are in order. There are two ways in which one can understand the term
phrase structure grammars. On the one hand, it is used to refer to all the levels on the Chomsky hierarchy above ﬁnite state
grammars. So, for example, in their supporting materials for their research, Fitch and Hauser (2004) explicitly state that they
understand phrase structure grammars to include types 0, 1, and 2 on the Chomsky hierarchy. In this sense the term phrase
structure grammars refers to a class of grammars within which there is a spectrum of generative power. And so it is usual to
speak of, say, a context-free phrase structure grammar. On the other hand, the term has also been used to refer to the speciﬁc
phrase structure rules that Chomsky (1957) showed are insufﬁcient to capture the grammar of English. It is important to keep
these two senses of the term separate. The particular phrase structure grammar rules that Chomsky (1957) discussed are of
course not sufﬁcient to capture the complexity of natural language syntax, but this is a different point to the claim that phrase
structure grammars (as a set of grammars including types 0, 1, and 2 on the Chomsky hierarchy) are necessary for the
generation of natural language sentences.
There was a decades-long debate about which phrase structure grammar (context-free, context-sensitive, or recursively
enumerable) is best for capturing natural language syntax. Chomsky (1957) argued early on that English cannot be captured
by ﬁnite state grammars because the latter cannot allow for structures with multiple long-distance dependencies and
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context-free rules either because certain syntactic phenomena (such as sentence transformations from active to passive) are
beyond their formal capabilities. He concluded that natural language grammars must be type 0 grammars, which he termed
transformational grammars. However, subsequent work has shown that transformational grammars are in fact too powerful
and require a set of cumbersome constraints if they are towork for natural languages (see Jäger and Rogers, 2012 for a review).
This means that natural languagesmust be lower on the hierarchy. As Fitch and Friederici (2012: 1938) remark, “it is now clear
that certain phenomena of natural language require context-sensitive grammars, andmost researchers in this ﬁeld now agree
that human languages require ‘mildly context-sensitive’ grammars (MSCGs): grammars whose power is just a bit beyond
those capturable by a context-free grammar”. The current consensus is that natural languages are mildly context-sensitive,
falling somewhere between type 2 and type 1 grammars on the hierarchy (Pullum and Gazdar, 1982; Joshi, 1985; Stabler,
2004). So natural languages are phrase structure grammars in the above ﬁrst sense (namely, mildly context-sensitive
grammars) but in the second sense they cannot be captured by the speciﬁc set of phrase structure grammar rules that
Chomsky (1957) discussed.
Henceforth I follow Fitch and Hauser (2004) in using the term phrase structure grammars as denoting the class of grammars
above ﬁnite state grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy because, like them, I want to avoid the technical debates about the
exact level on the hierarchy that natural language should be couched. This is because the main point in my discussion here is
that animals cannot compute structures belonging to phrase structure grammars as a class at all. The use of the term in this
way is consistent with the way Chomsky himself used the term in his early publications. To put the matter differently, the
argument in regard to where natural language falls on the Chomsky hierarchy is moot in the context of this article because
animals cannot even process phrase structure grammars. Their cognitive system does not allow them to compute any
structures generated by even the least computationally powerful phrase structure grammar.2
Finally, it should be noted that the Chomsky hierarchy is theory-neutral in the sense that it is a formal mathematical
hierarchy that does not depend on generative syntax. The latter’s conception of phrase structure theory has changed from its
earliest incarnation, the main stages to the present include X-bar Theory (Chomsky, 1970; Jackendoff, 1977), Government and
Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1981) and the current theory of Minimalist syntax (Chomsky, 1995). Other approaches include
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) (Gazdar et al., 1985) and Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG)
(Pollard and Sag, 1994). Though as Fukui (2001) notes, the various approaches to phrase structure theory have begun to
converge and to fruitfully inﬂuence each other. For example, “given the foremost importance of features in the theory of
phrase structure (and in the Minimalist program generally), the explicit mechanisms of feature systems developed in other
approaches (e.g. in the GPSG/HPSG traditions) may well have an important impact on further development of the bare theory
[of Minimalist syntax]” (Fukui, 2001: 403).
2.2. Where on the hierarchy does animal cognition fall?
There are a number of recent studies looking at whether animals can grasp ﬁnite state grammars and phrase structure
grammars (Yip, 2006; Hilliard and White, 2009; Bolhuis et al., 2010; Abe and Watanabe, 2011; Berwick et al., 2011a,b). These
studies use the artiﬁcial grammar learning paradigm, which makes use of formal language theory to assess what types of
patterns animals can detect in artiﬁcially prepared string sets (see Fitch et al., 2012 for an overview). As part of their ongoing
work on nonhuman primates, Fitch and Hauser (2004) created two simple grammars, one a ﬁnite state grammar and the
other a phrase structure grammar, and tested cotton-top tamarins to determine whether they could master either of them.
The newly created grammars were used to generate meaningless auditory strings consisting of consonant-vowel speech
syllables. Each grammar consisted of two classes of syllables (a and b), each of which contained eight different consonant-
vowel combinations. The ﬁnite state grammar was of the form (ab)n, in which a random a syllable was always followed by
a random b syllable, and then such pairs were repeated n times. An example of this stimulus presented to the tamarins is ab ab
(containing the syllables no li j ba pa) and ab ab ab (containing the syllables la pa j wumo j no li). The phrase structure grammar
was of the form anbn, in which n sequential a syllables must be followed by n sequential b syllables. An example of this
stimulus is aa bb (containing the syllables yo la j pa do) and aaa bbb (containing the syllables ba la tu j li pa ka) (Fitch and
Hauser, 2004: 378). The two grammars were matched for length, composition, loudness, and other acoustic features and
were in general designed to differ in nothing but their capacity to generate hierarchical phrase structures (Fitch and Hauser,
2004: 378). That is, the experiment was set up in such a way as to ensure that the only difference between the grammars
was that one is a ﬁnite state grammar and that the other, which is a phrase structure grammar, cannot in principle be
approximated by a ﬁnite state grammar.
In order to learn the anbn phrase structure grammar, which is easy for humans to do, one needsmore computational power
than a ﬁnite state grammar can provide. That is, one needs to be able to keep track of the long-distance structural de-
pendencies between the groups formed by the a’s and b’s. Fitch and Hauser (2004) showed that tamarins easily mastered the
ﬁnite state grammar, displaying the ability to discover, without explicit training, the rules governing patterns in auditory
stimuli (see also Saffran et al., 2008; Endress et al., 2009; Locurto et al., 2015). In contrast to this ability, the tamarins were
unable to master the phrase structure grammar, and this failure “cannot be due to extraneous factors such as stimulus length,2 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to the need to stress this point.
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procedures, all of whichwere consistent between the two grammars” (Fitch and Hauser, 2004: 379). Indeed, the results of this
experiment (as well as the others cited in this section) are consistent with the explanation that the tamarins attempted to
parse the phrase structure grammar presented to them by building a ﬁnite state grammar based on simple translational
probabilities. But this is not possible because a ﬁnite state grammar does not possess the right computational machinery for
the task. In other words, the cotton-top tamarins were presented with a ﬁnite state grammar and a phrase structure grammar
that were equivalent in every respect except for a particular type of hierarchical structure; in contrast to their ability to
spontaneously learn the ﬁnite state grammar, they were unable to spontaneously learn the phrase structure grammar that is
indicative of the sort of hierarchical structure that is essential for natural language syntax.
Note that the claim here is not that the totality of an animal’s cognitive processes are as representationally powerful as the
most powerful grammar that the animal can learn. I don’t think one can draw such general conclusions. Moreover, I am not
arguing that humans are superior, nor that a purported superiority of humans is due to their ability to master grammars
higher up on the Chomsky hierarchy. Nothing in my argument precludes some animals having more powerful representa-
tional resources in other domains. Rather, the claim here is that humans have a cognitive process not shared with other
animals, and that what makes this possible is the ability to reﬂexively master phrase structure grammars. The ability of non-
human animals to master ﬁnite state grammars, and their inability to master phrase structure grammars, has been inves-
tigated in birds, marine animals, and other animals (see Hilliard and White, 2009 for a review of the evidence). All such
studies point to the conclusion that non-humans animals, as Fitch and Hauser put it in regard to tamarins, “suffer from a
speciﬁc and fundamental computational limitation on their ability to spontaneously recognize or remember hierarchically
organized acoustic structures” (Fitch and Hauser, 2004: 380). In other words, “nonhumans are ‘stuck’ trying to interpret PSG-
generated stimuli at the FSG level [. thus making] PSG stimuli seem much more complex to them and perhaps even
unlearnable in ﬁnite time” (Fitch and Hauser, 2004: 380). Humans, on the other hand, easily learn phrase structure grammars
and appear to favour input that can be interpreted as such.3 Phrase structure grammars form a crucial component of all
human languages (allowing for recursively-embedded, hierarchically-structured strings), and the mental computations that
allow their use and interpretation underlie a speciﬁc type of cognitive process that appears to be only available to humans and
that is discussed below.
So there are two inferences here that need to be discussed and justiﬁed. One is the inference from the inability to interpret
certain grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy to the existence of a fundamental computational limitation. The second
inference has as its premise that the underlying computations necessary for phrase structure grammar are the same as those
necessary for human thought. If this is the case, then we can infer from the ability to interpret phrase structure grammars to
the ability to think certain types of thoughts. I discuss each of these in turn below.3. The inability to interpret certain grammars as evidence of a fundamental computational limitation
Let us look at some examples of what the inference from the inability to interpret certain grammars on the Chomsky
hierarchy to the existence of a fundamental computational limitation amounts to. In their discussion and review of the use of
formal language theory in studies of the ability of humans and animals to recognise grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy,
Rogers and Hauser (2010) remark that the aim of this line of research is to “set up a range of patterns or stringsets that enable
more systematic explorations and discoveries of the underlying psychological mechanisms” (Rogers and Hauser, 2010: 215).
The task of a subject in these experiments was to infer the pattern of a large, possibly inﬁnite, stringset from a small sample
that contained only positive examples (recall the (ab)n ﬁnite state grammar discussed above). Since subjects clearly cannot
“extract patterns that are more complicated than they are able to distinguish”, Rogers and Hauser argue that “the stringset
they [the subjects] arrive at is an indicator of the capacity of the cognitive machinery they can bring to bear on the task”
(Rogers and Hauser, 2010: 215). Knowing the types of grammar (or, more generally, the types of rule-based patterns) that a
subject can and cannot recognise reveals a great deal about the cognitive mechanisms of that subject. In other words, if a
computation is necessary for recognising a certain pattern, and if we have good evidence that a cognitive system cannot
recognise this pattern, then we have good evidence that the cognitive system is not capable of the underlying computation.
Fitch and Friederici (2012) show that in order to recognise patterns based on the anbn phrase structure grammar a
cognitive system must be able to do more than simply count, which many vertebrates are capable of. That is, in order to
recognise anbn, a cognitive system must be able to count and compare across phrases. At the very least the system must be
able to tally the number of a’s and store that number, then tally the number of b’s and store that number, and then compare
the two tallied numbers (this is the so-called count-and-compare computation). If the system can represent the exact number
of a’s and b’s, and if these values are not bounded a priori to a ﬁxed number, then the pattern corresponding to the grammar
cannot be recognised or generated by any algorithm on the ﬁnite state grammar level of the Chomsky hierarchy (i.e., at least a
context-free grammar is needed). Fitch and Friederici remark that “[t]he evidence from animals, thus far, suggests that this
computation [of count-and-compare], unlike counting, is difﬁcult or impossible for most tested non-human species” and that3 Indeed, even though prosodic or statistical cues can aid the human listener, hierarchical linguistic structures in speech do not have boundaries that are
clearly deﬁned, and so the structures must be constructed internally on the basis of the listener’s grammatical knowledge. See Berwick et al. (2011b), Ding
et al. (2016).
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and Friederici, 2012: 1943, emphasis in original). That is, the count-and-compare computation is needed in order to recognise
the anbn grammar, and so we can conclude that if a cognitive system cannot recognise a pattern based on the anbn grammar
then it cannot implement the count-and-compare computation. Moreover, the structural information and interpretations
inherent in the anbn grammar is of course unavailable to such a system. Thus, we can shed light on the nature of the cognitive
processes of an animal by investigating the types of grammars that they can recognise.
To put the matter another way, the following three steps embody the ﬁrst inference:
(1) A particular type of pattern can only be generated by, say, the anbn phrase structure grammar. This is a result of formal
mathematics and formal language theory. No amount of time computing the pattern using a ﬁnite state grammar will
yield the required result.
(2) A certain computational ability is necessary in order to generate or recognise a particular pattern (say the count-and-
compare computation necessary for recognising the anbn phrase structure grammar).
(3) We can thus conclude that if a cognitive system cannot recognise a particular pattern then it lacks the underlying
computational ability that is necessary to recognise this pattern.
I should note that the conclusion is an empirical question, not a matter of deductive logic, for it is conceivable that the
animals tested in the experiments cited above do have access to the computations in question but did not display them in the
experiments. It is conceivable, in other words, that future experiments might show that animals do have the required
computational ability. The main point I wish to highlight here, however, is that the structure of the above inference is sound.
That is, given that the premises are right, we can infer the conclusion. But what makes the premises right or wrong is an
empirical question. Whether animals can recognise patterns based on phrase structure grammars is an empirical question to
which the studies cited above have answered negatively. But even if it could be shown that animals can recognise patterns
based on phrase structure grammars, the structure and validity of the inference will remain. This is an inference to the best
explanation: given that a cognitive system cannot recognise patterns based on phrase structure grammars, our best expla-
nation for this fact is that it does not have access to the underlying computations that are necessary for their recognition and
generation.
Another seemingly simple grammar (from the humanperspective) that is nevertheless very difﬁcult or perhaps impossible
for some animals to learn even aftermuch training is the mirror grammarwwR, wherew represents any string and R indicates
that the string is to be reversed. A mirror grammar deﬁned over a and b will generate strings such as abba, baab, babbab, in
which the right half mirrors the left half. The computations inherent in the wwR grammar can only be generated and rec-
ognised by context-free grammars. Such grammars are well suited to examining the ability of cognitive systems to recognise
pattern-based centre-embedded phrases and bilateral symmetry in general. Stobbe et al. (2012), for example, tested such a
grammar on both pigeons and kea and showed that all the tested animal subjects failed to learn discriminations based upon
symmetry. That is, the birds could not see the patterns in the world that were based upon that sort of symmetry because they
do not have access to the computations in virtue of which such patterns can be generated and recognised. Stobbe et al. argue
that the birds’ failure to learn these discriminations can be understood in terms of what grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy
the birds can recognise. When presented with the stimuli the birds acquired the wrong pattern rule, but the rule they ac-
quired was consistent with a cognitive system attempting to use computational abilities on the ﬁnite state grammar level to
recognise a pattern based on a phrase structure grammar. That is, the birds detected some local dependencies in the patterns
that are capturable by ﬁnite state grammars, but that was not enough in order to solve the generalisation task, for the
intended rule was on the phrase structure grammar level.
Stobbe et al.’s inference from the inability of the birds to interpret certain grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy to the
existence of a fundamental computational limitation is independently veriﬁed by other studies using different methods.
Swaddle and Ruff (2004) showed that starlings were not able to discriminate symmetry from asymmetry. They presented the
birds with symmetric and asymmetric images that resemble the complex dot patterns commonly seen on the chest plumage
of starlings, but following extended training sessions the birds were not able to discriminate between the two. Swaddle and
Ruff argue that although “complex dot patterns (similar to those studies here) are common in nature, it appears unlikely that
starlings (and perhaps other birds) could use number asymmetry in such traits as a direct cue to mediate behavioural in-
teractions” (Swaddle and Ruff, 2004: 29). The experiments of Huber et al. (1999) also concluded that pigeons do not classify
stimuli on the basis of an underlying symmetry rule. Since the birds in these experiments could not process the patterns
based upon phrase structure grammars, there is a real sense inwhich they do not see the world in the same way as an animal
with a cognitive system that can recognise patterns based on phrase structure grammars. Research of this kind shows that
ﬁguring out what kinds of patterns on the Chomsky hierarchy a cognitive system can recognise tells us a great deal about the
psychological process (and the underlying computations) of this system.
Considering the results of the above-mentioned research, Fitch and Friederici (2012) conclude that “[i]f there is a
fundamental computational restriction that prevents most species from accessing even bilateral symmetry or ‘count-and-
compare’ strategies, this is surely relevant to these species’ inability to acquire the syntax of natural language, which by all
accounts require supra-regular [context-free] capabilities of at least this level of computational power” (Fitch and Friederici,
2012: 1944). That is, the inability to recognise themirror grammarwwR shows the inability to recognise pattern-based centre-
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bilateral symmetry, and so cognitive systems that cannot compute the mirror grammar wwR do not have access to such
interpretations: they cannot construe the world in that way. In other words, the patterns (including the dependencies and
structure therein) that a cognitive system can recognise embody a particular perspective on the world; the patterns the
system is able to recognise reveals the way inwhich the system sees the world, the way inwhich it understands and interacts
with the world.4. The underlying computations of human thought
The previous section detailed the inference from the inability to interpret certain grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy to
the existence of a fundamental computational limitation. The research cited was mostly negative in that it inferred a
computational limitation from a particular inability to recognise a pattern. The second inference I would like to discuss,
however, is a positive one: what follows if a particular cognitive system can recognise phrase structure grammars? The
premise of this inference is that the underlying computations necessary for phrase structure grammar are the same as those
necessary for a particular subset of human thought. I will ﬁrst discuss this premise, and then argue that if this is the case then
we can infer from the ability to interpret phrase structure grammars to the ability to think certain types of thoughts.
Recall that a theory of language needs to specify a class of structural descriptions that provides the necessary information
for the production and comprehension of natural language sentences. The way inwhich this class is generated is crucial, for a
grammar that generates the observable corpus of sentences is of little value unless it provides, via structural descriptions, the
required structural information in the right form for interpretation. Now, if a system cannot compute the class of grammars
that correctly generates the required structural descriptions for natural language then it follows that it cannot understand the
interpretations inherent in these structural descriptions. On the assumption that one of the uses of language is to externalise
internally constructed thoughts, we can conclude that if a system cannot compute the structural descriptions of natural
language then it cannot think the particular thoughts that can only be externalised using those structural descriptions. In
other words, if a cognitive system cannot compute a particular class of grammars then anything expressible only within that
class is unavailable to it. There are different types of thought that humans can construct internally that can be externalised via
language, many of these we share with other animals. But the type that is unique to humans has its foundation in language
itself. That is, the underlying mechanisms of language (via the construction of structural descriptions) do not merely express
pre-formed thoughts but also allow humans to think particular types of thoughts that are unavailable to beings who do not
have these computational mechanisms. Language is thus an instrument of thought (Burton-Roberts, 2011; Chomsky, 2013;
Hinzen, 2013; Asoulin, 2016).
The particular type of structural relations that are essential for the generation and recognition of sentences, and which
allow for recursively embedded and hierarchically structured strings, cannot be generated by ﬁnite state grammars. Finite
state grammars can generate some types of structured and hierarchical strings, but these structures are not of the right type in
regard to the structural descriptions essential for natural language interpretation. The nature of the kind of thought that
requires the ability to recognise and generate phrase structure grammars can be explicated in a number of ways. Oneway is to
consider the distinction between noun phrases (NPs) and sentences. Every human language makes a distinction between NPs
and sentences, which is “a distinction between, on the one hand, what is referred to and, on the other hand, assertions made
(or questions asked) about what is referred to” (Carstairs-McCarthy, 2000: 250). Compare, for example, the sentence John
arrived yesterday with the NPs John or the man who lives in Sydney. Carstairs-McCarthy (1999, 2000) argues that the NP/
sentence distinction “permit[s] a more precise characterisation of the kinds of thing that could and could not be said with a
syntax that conforms rigidly to a syllabic model [i.e., one that predates modern human natural language syntax]” (Carstairs-
McCarthy, 2000: 254). Every human language makes such a distinction and every human cognitive process that is not shared
with animals also embodies such a distinction. Jackendoff (2002: 327) notes that the parallelism between NPs and sentences
“lies in the parallelism between conceptualized objects and conceptualized situations.” The upshot is that without the ability
to construct natural language sentences, access to the particular conceptualised situations that these sentences encode is
blocked. In other words, a cognitive system so impeded cannot conceptualise the world in that way, it cannot think about the
world in that speciﬁc way. Thus, if the generative power of ﬁnite state grammars is insufﬁcient for the generation of the sort of
structural dependencies (such as self-embedding) that are necessary for natural language sentences, and if such sentences
provide access to speciﬁc types of conceptualised situations, then it follows that cognitive systems without the ability to do
the former have no access to the latter.
Let us consider a speciﬁc example, taken from Hinzen (2006), of the implications of humans uniquely possessing the NP/
sentence distinction as a structural design feature of our cognitive system. Consider a glass of water on a table in front of you.
You can refer to the glass by using an NP, and you can refer to the water by using an NP. But when you say This glass contains
waterwhat are you referring to? “Clearly you are not referring to the glass,” says Hinzen, “for here you would use ‘This glass’;
not the water, for then you would use ‘this water’, or ‘the water in the glass’; [and] not the relation of containing” (Hinzen,
2006: 145). There is a puzzle here, for thinking that this glass contains water is not the same as thinking this glass, and then
thinking contains, and then thinking water. In other words, “a sequence of ideas does not yet constitute a complex idea. But
there are complex ideas, over and above simple ones. Therefore, thinking a complex idea (such as a sentence) is not thinking a
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markedly from cognitive systems that do not, for a sentence is not a mere list of ideas or concepts, and to capture the speciﬁc
kind of conceptual content sentences provide we need to access not only the constituents of the sentence but also the speciﬁc
structural relations holding between these constituents (see also Hinzen, 2012). Phrase structure grammars of the type
discussed above provide humans (and as far as we know only humans) with the ability to generate and interpret these
structural relations. Note that this is not a matter of complexity, for complex NPs are possible without giving rise to sentences.
Recent empirical research also supports this conclusion. de Villiers (2014: 113), for example, lays out the “arguments and
evidence that I-language makes possible some concepts that might not exist in a non-linguistic creature.” Such concepts
include “the concept of the class of events describable by a three term reversible sentence, namely one in which the hier-
archical arrangement of arguments deﬁnes the agency, namely, the direction of action.” de Villiers’s lab tested whether
infants could learn to form concepts of three term reversible, transitive events like boy chasing dog prior to language. They
found that children “were much better at re-enacting the event when they heard the event described – the Language con-
dition – than in the ‘No-language’ conditionwhere they received no linguistic scaffolding” (de Villiers, 2014: 105).While more
empirical work is needed, the results are “certainly compatible with the idea that language provides an assist in holding onto
a reversible transitive event to reproduce it with new exemplars.” In other words, “the claim is that I-language allows humans
to see resemblances among events that are similar in only an abstract waymediated by their linguistic description, such as the
hierarchical form <boy chase dog> that unites the class of events in which a boy chases a dog, not vice- versa” (de Villiers,
2014: 100).
The claim here is that only humans can recognise the event boy chasing dog “because it is a structured syntactic object
whose arguments are in a certain speciﬁed relation to one another: it is not enough that the elements BOY, CHASE and DOG be
present in the scene” (de Villiers, 2014: 103). Moreover, the underlying mechanisms of language allow humans to construct
expressions that are constituted of variables, not just particulars. That is, “[j]ust as BOY does not refer to a speciﬁc boy but
instead to the set of all boys, the composed form BOY CHASE DOG can potentially refer to an inﬁnity of possible events in
which a boy is chasing a dog. This linguistic structure thus brings similarity to a set of events in the world that had no unity
before” (de Villiers, 2014: 103, emphasis in original). de Villiers admits that this is a strong claim, but that it is also empirically
testable. Her lab has provided good preliminary evidence from children and adults that support this claim (see also Dessalegn
and Landau, 2008).
Another way to understand the kind of thought that requires the ability to recognise phrase structure grammars is given in
Jackendoff andWittenberg (2014), who investigate “howmuch and what kind of thought can be expressed without resorting
to the tools provided by fully complex syntax?” and “What can semantic structure alone accomplish before syntax is needed
to regiment the message?” (Jackendoff andWittenberg, 2014: 65). They develop an alternative to the Chomsky hierarchy and
propose amodel of successivelymore complex sound-to-meaningmappings. According to their model, there comes a point in
the hierarchy below which less complex grammars are a direct mapping from sound to meaning, leaving no need for a
syntactic level. Syntax, they argue, is not needed in every language and language-like system for it “is one step removed from
meaning: it is a formal system that abstracts away from semantic categories, that labels constituents in terms of abstract
categories such as nouns and verbs, and that imposes formal structure on them” (Jackendoff and Wittenberg, 2014: 67). The
point in the hierarchy at which syntax is needed, they argue, is when the required strings necessitate structural relations that
cannot be generated by ﬁnite state grammars and can only be generated by at least context-free grammars.
According to Jackendoff andWittenberg (2014: 68ff.), the simplest conceivable grammar is a one-word grammar, inwhich
utterances are restricted to a single word. The next simplest grammar is a two-word grammar, which leads directly to a
concatenation grammar that allows utterances to consist of word strings of arbitrary length. As Jackendoff and Wittenberg
remark, interpretation in these three grammars is conditioned by semantic distinctions and not by syntax. In other words, in
these (ﬁnite state) grammars “there is no real syntax in the usual sense, as deﬁned by syntactic categories and syntactic
markers of these categories” (Jackendoff and Wittenberg, 2014: 69). Now, when we require the grouping of words into
phrases (and then the grouping of phrases into larger phrases), the need for syntax arises. A simple phrase grammar in the
Jackendoff and Wittenberg model allows words to be grouped into phrases, and such grammars are among the simplest
possible context-free grammars. The difference between a concatenation grammar and a phrase grammar is their interface
rules, which link utterances produced by these grammars with meanings. The simplest interface rule is that used in a one-
word grammar inwhich themeaning of theword equals themeaning of the utterance. There is thus no difference between an
utterance and a word here, and so the interface rule reduces to a one-to-one mapping between phonology and semantics
(between a particular sound and a particular meaning). Jackendoff and Wittenberg speculate that such simple interface rules
are necessary for most primate calls.
In order to addmore expressive power, however, a syntax is needed to augment the phonology-to-semantics mapping. So,
for example, scaling up to more syntactically complex grammars we have one-phrase utterances that link a particular phrase
to a particular meaning, which in turn is linked to a particular sound. This allows the grammar to express meanings that move
beyond the meanings of the individual words. Such more complex grammars can combine the meanings of the parts via the
syntax to create new meanings that are not a direct mapping from the meanings of the parts.4 Hinzen is here paraphrasing Fodor (2003: 92).
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semantics (see also Hornstein, 2009), the leading idea of which is that “in the course of language acquisition, humans use
available concepts to introduce formally new concepts that can be fetched via lexical items and combined via certain
operations that are invoked by the human faculty of language” (Pietroski, 2010: 247, emphasis in original). That is, meanings
are (internal, and unconscious) instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. Meaning is here un-
derstood not in an extensional sense but rather in terms of the cognitive resources (the computational procedures) that
humans deploy in generating the meanings. The meaning of a structured concept depends on its primitive elements and on
the way inwhich they are combined. But not any combination is possible: there is a syntax that determines how concepts can
(and cannot) be combined. As we saw above, there are certain syntactic relations (such as the dependencies in phrase
structure grammars) that can only be generated above a certain level in the Chomsky hierarchy. It follows, then, that a
cognitive system that lacks the ability to generate and interpret phrase structure grammars has no access to the meanings
that are only generable via these grammars.
Human language syntax allows us to take already existing concepts and combine them to produce distinctively new
concepts that we are then able to combine again to form linguistic expressions. This process of lexicalisation and concate-
nation is part of the explanation of the creative aspect of language use (Chomsky,1966;McGilvray, 2001, 2005; Asoulin, 2013).
According to Pietroski’s Conjunctivist account of linguistic composition (Hornstein and Pietroski, 2009; Pietroski, 2018),
lexicalisation is not a process in which a previously available concept is merely labelled using a lexical item that inherits its
content from the concept itself. Rather lexicalisation is a device for accessing previously available concepts which become
lexical items that are used as input to linguistic operations that combine the lexical items in speciﬁc ways to introduce new
formally distinct concepts. Another way to put the matter is as follows. Humans possess a great variety of pre-lexical mental
representations (many of which we share with other animals). On the Conjunctivist account, these pre-lexical mental rep-
resentations are linked via human syntax to formally distinct but analytically similar concepts. The latter are sometimes
referred to as I-concepts (Jackendoff, 1989, 1990). Thus, “the repertoire of I-concepts expressed by sentences cannot be
mentally encoded as a list, but must be characterized in terms of a ﬁnite set of mental primitives and a ﬁnite set of principles
of mental combination that collectively describe the set of possible I-concepts expressed by sentences” (Jackendoff, 1990: 9).
I-concepts, then, are a uniquely human subset of concepts that humans can use to think about the world. If lexical meanings
are understood to be instructions to fetch concepts, then phrases are understood to be instructions to combine these fetched
concepts in speciﬁc ways. The internalist semantics claim, then, is that understanding a linguistic expression is a matter of
(unconsciously) recognising that that expression is an instruction to construct concepts of a special kind (see also Asoulin
forthcoming).
As Fodor (1975) famously argued, there are parallels between the structure of language and the structure of thought. That
is, theway inwhich the constituents of sentences are related in a systematic waymirrors theway inwhich the constituents of
thought are related in a systematic way. Fodor argued that the reason for this is that language and thought both employ a
generative procedure that allows the creation of an unbounded set of structured expressions. This procedure is a compu-
tational mechanism that allows humans to produce recursive and hierarchically structured expressions indicative of phrase
structure grammars. Though note again that such a procedure of course cannot be responsible for all of our thought processes,
for much of what we sharewith animal cognition is clearly rich and complex but does not involve language nor its underlying
mechanisms. I argued above that one way in which to determine the extent to which conceptual thought is inﬂuenced or
determined by the underlying computational procedures of language is by looking at where on the Chomsky hierarchy a
particular cognitive system falls.
I should note that the usage-based approach to linguistics, which includes the various strands of functional and
cognitive linguistics, rejects the claim that language is an independent cognitive faculty (Langacker, 1987; Tomasello,
2003, 2008; Bybee, 2010; Christiansen and Chater, 2015). Their claim is that the underlying cognitive mechanisms
of language are not language-speciﬁc and that language acquisition is due to domain-general mechanisms found
elsewhere in human cognition. This is an ongoing debate, and the work of, amongst others, Berwick et al. (2011a,b) and
Adger and Svenonius (2015) speciﬁcally addresses the usage-based approach and argues against it and in favour of
innate, domain-speciﬁc mechanisms of language. I agree with the latter, but notice that even if there is nothing unique
to language in human cognition (so that we can generate and comprehend grammatical structures using domain-
general and non-language-speciﬁc cognitive computations only), that would leave unaffected the claim that the
uniquely human thought system is underwritten by the computational mechanisms that are revealed by studying
whether subjects can recognise patterns based on particular phrase structure grammars on the Chomsky hierarchy.
This is because there is nothing particularly linguistic about such formal mathematical hierarchies. The different levels
on the hierarchy provide researchers with a measure of the complexity of structured patterns that a subject can and
cannot recognise. They are a measure of cognitive complexity that can be manifested in any modality. This is the
strength of using the Chomsky hierarchy, for it allows us to create structured patterns that provide a window into the
underlying cognitive mechanisms in virtue of which such patterns can be generated and recognised. The work of
Swaddle and Ruff (2004) and Stobbe et al. (2012), for example, used visual patterns generated by rules at different
levels of computational complexity on the Chomsky hierarchy in order to better understand the underlying cognitive
mechanisms of pattern perception in birds.
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To sum up, the structural information and interpretations inherent in the strings generated by phrase structure grammars
are indicative of a uniquely human kind of thought. Cognitive systems that cannot compute phrase structure grammars do not
have access to such interpretations: they cannot think about theworld in that way. In other words, the patterns (including the
dependencies and structure therein) that a cognitive system can recognise embody a particular perspective on the world; the
patterns the system is able to recognise reveals the way in which the system sees the world, the way in which it understands
and interacts with the world. Thus, knowing the types of grammar on the Chomsky hierarchy (or, more generally, the types of
rule-based patterns) that a subject can and cannot recognise reveals a great deal about the cognitive mechanisms of that
subject. I argued that the subset of human thought that is not shared with animals can be accounted for by the underlying
computational mechanisms of language (allowing for recursively-embedded, hierarchically-structured strings) that structure
this subset of human thought in a particular way. This subset of thought is unavailable to cognitive systems that do not have
access to the computations underlying natural language.
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